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ABSTRACT
Objective To systematically learn lessons from the 
experiences of countries implementing find, test, trace, 
isolate, support (FTTIS) in the first wave of the COVID-19 
pandemic.
Design, data sources and eligibility criteria We 
searched MEDLINE (PubMed), Cochrane Library, SCOPUS 
and JSTOR, initially between 31 May 2019 and 21 January 
2021. Research articles and reviews on the use of contact 
tracing, testing, self- isolation and quarantine for COVID-19 
management were included in the review.
Data extraction and synthesis We extracted information 
including study objective, design, methods, main findings 
and implications. These were tabulated and a narrative 
synthesis was undertaken given the diverse research 
designs, methods and implications.
Results We identified and included 118 eligible studies. 
We identified the core elements of an effective find, test, 
trace, isolate, support (FTTIS) system needed to interrupt 
the spread of a novel infectious disease, where treatment 
or vaccination was not yet available, as pertained in 
the initial stages of the COVID-19 pandemic. We report 
methods used to shorten case finding time, improve 
accuracy and efficiency of tests, coordinate stakeholders 
and actors involved in an FTTIS system, support 
individuals isolating and make appropriate use of digital 
tools.
Conclusions We identified in our systematic review 
the key components of an FTTIS system. These include 
border controls, restricted entry, inbound traveller 
quarantine and comprehensive case finding; repeated 
testing to minimise false diagnoses and pooled testing 
in resource- limited circumstances; extended quarantine 
period and the use of digital tools for contact tracing 
and self- isolation. Support for mental or physical health 
and livelihoods is needed for individuals undergoing 
self- isolation/quarantine. An integrated system with 
rolling- wave planning can best use effective FTTIS tools 
to respond to the fast- changing COVID-19 pandemic. 
Results of the review may inform countries considering 
implementing these measures.
INTRODUCTION
Interrupting transmission of COVID-19 has 
depended on rapid isolation of infected indi-
viduals. For this to happen, a complex set of 
co- ordinated elements must be implemented 
to find potential cases, either by identifying 
those who have symptoms or examination of 
individuals at risk, test to confirm the pres-
ence of infection, trace contacts, isolate those 
infected and their contacts1 and support2 
those in isolation to reduce the risk that they 
will breach any restrictions.
While various elements of a find, test, trace, 
isolate, support (FTTIS) system have long 
been core elements of the public health role, 
COVID-19 infection has some specific char-
acteristics, such as transmission by presymp-
tomatic and asymptomatic individuals3 and a 
strong age gradient in disease severity as well 
as other features that remain poorly under-
stood. Despite this uncertainty, some coun-
tries have implemented successful COVID-19 
FTTIS programmes, which have achieved 
Strengths and limitations of this study
 ► The study systematically reviews the core elements 
of an effective find, test, trace, isolate, support 
(FTTIS) system to interrupt the spread of COVID-19. 
Our findings can inform policy in future pandemics.
 ► We reported optimal strategies reported in the lit-
erature to shorten case finding time, improve both 
accuracy and efficiency of tests, coordinate stake-
holders and actors involved in an FTTIS system, sup-
port individuals as they progress from case finding 
to isolation and make appropriate use of digital tools 
to facilitate the programme.
 ► The main limitation is the scarcity of quantitative 
studies.
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coordination among relevant actors, including central 
and local government authorities, laboratories and the 
medical care system.1 These actors are interconnected by 
integrated real- time information flow. However, the ways 
that they have created these systems have varied, largely 
determined by existing structures.
There are no simple solutions. Thus, digital tools were 
initially seen as making a major contribution to FTTIS 
programmes.1 3 Yet while the English National Health 
Service (NHS) contact tracing app showed positive results 
in a pilot study, decreasing rates of transmission,4 it strug-
gled to achieve a sufficient level of uptake to be effective.5 
Individuals, organisations or occupational groups with 
high COVID-19 risk need additional support to use such 
apps2 while it can be challenging to reduce the burden of 
unnecessary or repeated episodes of quarantine.
The main challenges in implementing an FTTIS 
programme include developing a strategy that can reduce 
delays in finding cases and contacts,1 ensuring the accu-
racy of tests,1 establishing integrated systems,6 7 reducing 
barriers to adhering to regulations, especially isolating8 9 
and mitigating adverse economic impacts on the liveli-
hood of individuals affected.9 To inform and support the 
design, implementation and continuous improvement of 
an FTTIS system, we conducted a systematic review, struc-
tured to answer a series of key questions that arose during 
the initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic. These 
policy questions addressed the following issues: (1) infra-
structure and processes needed to achieve a sampling- 
to- results process taking 24 hours or less, (2) adherence 
to isolation and local support needs, (3) real- time data 
management, linkage of datasets and dashboards and 
ownership of the data generated, (4) achieving a ‘rapid 
response’, (5) assimilation of an application (app) in 
light of the above, (6) overcoming the barriers to and 
enablers of being tested, reporting contacts and isolating 
as a result of being contacted.
METHODS
The systematic review follows the Preferred Reporting 
Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta- Analyses guide-
line. The review protocol is described as the following.
Eligible studies
Eligible studies are research articles and reviews evalu-
ating the strategies of contact tracing, testing, self- isolation 
and quarantine on COVID-19 management published 
in English worldwide during the urgent response of the 
COVID-19 pandemic (May 2019 to May 2020 and June 
2020 and January 2021).
Information sources and search
We searched MEDLINE (PubMed), Cochrane Library, 
SCOPUS and JSTOR. The search terms included ‘contact 
tracing’ or ‘testing’ or ‘self- isolation’ or ‘quarantine’ in 
the title in combination with ‘COVID-19’ or ‘COVID-
19’ or ‘coronavirus’ in the title or text. The full- search 
strategy is included in the online supplemental appendix 
1 section 1, and we apply the same search criteria for all 
the literature databases. The initial search included mate-
rial published up to 28 May 2020. Studies were limited to 
those in which the subjects were human. Relevant reports 
and literature cited in the papers identified as well as mate-
rial from other sources such as the COVID-19 Response 
Monitor developed by the European Observatory on 
Health Systems and Policies were also considered.10 
The initial search was subsequently updated to include 
material published between June 2020 and January 2021 
(online supplemental appendix 1 section 2).
Study selection
In the MEDLINE search, clinical studies, clinical trials, 
evaluation studies, government documents, journal arti-
cles, multicentre studies, observational studies, practice 
guidelines, pragmatic clinical trials and technical reports 
were included, as were reviewed. Studies whose subject 
areas were in medicine or social sciences in SCOPUS, and 
research reports in JSTOR (excluding book chapters) 
were selected. We screened title, abstract and content 
to remove studies unrelated to elements of FTTIS or 
COVID-19.
Data collection process and data items
For each publication, we extracted (where appropriate) 
information on study design, method, results, main find-
ings and limitations using the PICOS tool.11
Summary measures and synthesis of results
Following discussion with researchers involved in the 
COVID-19 response in the UK (https://www. indepen-
dentsage. org/), a list of key questions to answer was 
developed and answered using the literature collected. 
Sheng- Chia Chung, Sushila Marlow and Nicholas Tobias 
screened studies and extracted the data and disagree-
ments were resolved through discussions.
Risk of bias in individual studies
As studies eligible for policy review were mostly qualita-
tive, we managed by using the Critical Appraisal Skills 
Programme (CASP) tool to assess the methodological 
rigour of included studies12 (CASP Qualitative Studies 
Checklist).13
Patient and public involvement
The study questions were inspired by weekly public 
discussions held by Independent SAGE, a scientific group 
for COVID-19 response in the UK (https://www. indepen-
dentsage. org/).
RESULTS
In the initial search, we identified 50 studies from 
PUBMED (Medline), 43 studies from SCOPUS, 56 
from JSTOR, 1 from the Cochrane library and four 
from additional sources. The flow diagram is set out in 
figure 1. From the 164 initial publications, we removed 
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30 duplicate studies, 84 items were not directly focused 
on COVID-19 or strategy of testing, contact tracing or 
isolation or not in the format of a research report (such 
as editorials or podcasts). We subsequently identified an 
additional 58 studies in the second supplementary system-
atic review discussing FTTIS strategies during the early 
phase of the COVID-19 pandemic published between 
June 2020 and January 2021. We, thus, included a total 
of 118 studies in the review (online supplemental table 
S1). Eligible studies had clearly stated aims and applied 
appropriate methods, and although none addressed all 
proposed study questions, they provided data relevant to 
an aspect in our review (online supplemental table S2). A 
full list of studies included in the review is listed in online 
supplemental appendix 1 section 3.
Overview of FTTIS
We initially review some key findings on the COVID-19 
pandemic. A review by Nussbaumer- Streit B et al 
concluded that a combination of quarantine and other 
nonpharmaceutical interventions could significantly 
reduce COVID-19 incidence and mortality.14 Policy deci-
sions should be informed by a detailed understanding 
of transmission dynamics. With growing evidence that 
so- called super- spreading events played an important role 
in many outbreaks,15 finding, testing and isolating those 
present at such events was recognised as a priority.16 This 
relates to work by Manchein et al who proposed that the 
growth of COVID-19 cases follows a power–law pattern 
rather than an exponential one, suggesting that transmis-
sion is characterised by features of scale- free networks, 
fractal kinetics and small world features. The implica-
tion is that while social distancing has been important 
to slow the spread of COVID-19 so far, a robust testing 
and isolation would be necessary to facilitate economies 
to reopen.17 These conclusions were consistent with work 
from Italy stressing the importance of maintaining very 
strict quarantine of those affected.18 Policies must also be 
underpinned by high- quality population- level data, yet 
some countries have struggled to create well- functioning 
integrated systems. Inadequate testing will often under-
estimate the true number and growth rate of COVID-19 
cases.19 20 This is a challenge because testing is at the heart 
of a comprehensive FTTIS system and the only way to 
make a diagnosis where symptoms are atypical or unclear 
or in cases that are asymptomatic or presymptomatic.21 
For incidence, analysing surveillance data found that 
the high case fatality during the first 40- day COVID-19 
epidemic in Italy was primarily due to insufficient testing 
to characterise the outbreak accurately, thus masking 
transmission in the community and healthcare facili-
ties.22 In countries where FTTI interventions have been 
implemented subsequently, there has sometimes been a 
delay in their effect on disease control.23 There are now 
a number of reports of how FTTIS systems have been 
designed and operated.24
Figure 1 Systematic review study flow diagram. FTTIS, f﻿﻿﻿ind, test, trace, isolate, support.
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Infrastructure and procedure of a sampling-to-results process 
that is 24 hours or less
Countries have differed in whether they have built on 
existing infrastructure or created new structures to deal 
with the pandemic. We have identified two comple-
mentary elements in the reviewed studies, one involves 
increasing sampling capacity and the other scaling up 
laboratory capacity. The UK addressed the first of these 
by implementing drive- through SARS- CoV-2 testing25 
with patients being informed of their results within 
24–36 hours. It created a separate network of new stand-
alone laboratories. Lagier et al reported on SARS- CoV-2 
reverse transcription- PCR (RT- PCR) testing of repatriated 
French citizens during their initial response,26 with time 
from sample to result reduced to 3 hours by prioritising 
extraction of RNA from samples. Replacing the RNA 
extraction step by performing RT- PCR directly on heat- 
inactivated or lysed samples could accelerate the process 
further.27 Point of care testing could also reduce the time 
to results to less than 2 hours.28
Binniker has set out the steps that should be taken when 
scaling up activity in existing laboratories,29 which has the 
advantage of using networks already in place, including 
transport and communications. Similarly, Gupta et al have 
described how laboratories in universities and clinics in 
India were converted into testing centres.30 In Ethiopia, 
Abera et al reported using Malaria and Neglected Trop-
ical Diseases laboratories for COVID-19 testing.31 Tolia et 
al described the implementation of a testing programme 
within a hospital emergency department.32
Strategies to improve the testing response
The case definition of potential COVID-19 changed 
frequently in the initial stage of the epidemic, as knowl-
edge of the disease evolved. In the early stage of the 
epidemic, test kits and laboratory capacity were in short 
supply in many countries.33 An example of an early inves-
tigation is when the Dutch National Outbreak Manage-
ment Team investigated a potential SARS- CoV-2 local 
transmission, with rapid testing of healthcare workers 
in an area with a suspected COVID-19 outbreak. Testing 
followed a national protocol and was carried out either 
locally or in central laboratories. Nine hospitals were 
asked to sample healthcare workers on Saturday, 7 March 
and results were due on Monday, 9 March. When the 
SARS- CoV-2 positive rate came back as 4.1% among 1097 
tested, the local outbreak was confirmed.
Other laboratory- based strategies to improve testing 
efficiency include Yan et al suggesting placing samples in 
reagents containing guanidine salts, for example, TRIzol, 
TRIzol LS or AVL buffer, to inactivate the virus and protect 
RNA.34 Pooled testing approaches have been advocated 
to increase testing capacity35 36 and facilitate the detection 
of asymptomatic cases.37 Only if the pooled batch tested 
positive would sample contributing to the batch be tested 
individually.38 A three- stage pooling system was reported 
by Eberhardt et al who showed that it was possible to test 
three and seven times as many individuals with the same 
number of test kits when prevalence rates were 5% and 
1%, respectively.39
Several studies examined strategies to test high- risk 
individuals,40 41 concluding that it had potential if well 
targeted,42 whereas the utility of asymptomatic testing 
in low- prevalence setting may be low.43 Targeted testing, 
measured by tests per confirmed case, was reported 
to be correlated with a greater reduction in COVID-19 
fatality than population testing number (tests per million 
people) in The Organisation for Economic Co- operation 
and Development (OECD) countries and Taiwan.44 One 
measure of the performance of a contact tracing and 
testing system is a shorter interval between the diagnosis 
of the index and secondary cases.45 46
Minimising false test results
Inaccurate results can impede both the treatment of 
the patient and public health interventions to contain 
COVID-19 infection.47 Testing accuracy may be influ-
enced by sampling and testing kit performance. The gold 
standard for COVID-19 diagnosis remains RT- PCR- based 
assays with respiratory specimens, although these can 
give positive results due to the persistence of fragments of 
genetic material after the individual has ceased to be infec-
tious.48 Among different respiratory sampling methods, 
RT- PCR assays based on nasopharyngeal swabs tend to 
have a lower cycle threshold than oropharyngeal swabs.34 
Infected individuals who are initially RT- PCR negative are 
likely to become positive with repeated tests as the infec-
tion progresses,49 50 reflecting differences in the amount 
of virus at the site samples and viral shedding at the time 
of sampling.49–51 Sampling error can occur due to low 
levels of virus at the beginning or end period of shedding 
or inadequate sampling techniques. Thus, recommen-
dations are to take multiple samples,49 51 52 while some 
have proposed supporting RT- PCR results with Chest CT 
imaging.48 53
The performance of tests has improved over time. 
Thus, low sensitivity (30%) was reported in the RT- PCR 
testing kits in the early stage of the pandemic.54 In a 
review by Younes et al, RT- PCR testing kits developed in 
the USA, France and Germany had a high sensitivity, at 
95%, but specificity was not reported.48 Yan et al have 
suggested that human RNase P gene could be amplified 
as an internal control to reduce false- negative results and 
template volume could be increased to improve sensi-
tivity.34 One study from March 2020 in India found no 
false negatives but only five in seven positive tests were 
confirmed.30 As a consequence, all apparent positive 
tests were retested by the National Institute of Virology. 
Point of care rapid testing has obvious benefits in terms 
of speed of results55 but Döhla et al reported that tests 
available in the initial period of the pandemic had low 
sensitivity (36.4%) compared with RT- PCR, although this 
was in a small group of 39 patients with COVID-19.51
Besides RT- PCR testing, serologic antibody assays detect 
immunoglobin G and immunoglobin M to SARS- CoV-2 
after infection.56 This has been used to determine 
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whether an individual or the proportion of a population 
has previously been infected.57 Given concerns about the 
duration of antibodies and limitations in sampling and 
testing, there is a need for caution about potential false- 
negative results, and repeated testing may be required if 
symptoms persist. Testing at the end of the quarantine 
may help identify and care for delayed or asymptomatic 
COVID-19 cases while preventing further transmission.58
In addition to the aforementioned challenge relating 
to false- negative results, concern has been raised about 
the specificity of rapid antigen assays, with the risk of a 
high proportion of false positives, particularly as overall 
population prevalence reduces. For this reason, some 
countries are instigating PCR confirmation of positive 
rapid test results.59
Linked data to facilitate active case finding
There are several examples of how linked health service 
data can be used to identify cases.24 60 For example, 
the digital COVID-19 border control system in Taiwan 
collects the health information of inbound passengers. 
The data are linked to the ‘epidemic prevention tracking 
system’ used by health authorities to ensure isolation and 
quarantine of cases and are linked to the National Health 
Insurance MediCloud System, a cloud- based platform 
for medical professionals to gain updated clinical data 
of the patient seeking care.61 The data linkage provides 
medical staff with real- time information on the patient’s 
COVID-19 travel and contact history, home isolation and 
quarantine status, to provide necessary care with appro-
priate infectious control measures.62 Screening high- risk 
populations (such as healthcare workers) has been used 
for active case finding.63
Adherence to isolation and local support needs
Inbound traveller quarantine
Border controls and restricted entry were imposed in East 
Asian countries early in the pandemic,54 linked to compre-
hensive inbound traveller quarantine. For example, 
Singapore imposed a 14- day ‘Stay Home Notice’ (SHN) 
on visitors and returning residents from COVID-19 
endemic areas since January 2020 and for all inbound 
traveller from 9 April 2020. On arrival, travellers under-
went a 14- day mandatory stay in government- designated 
hotels. During this period, they were not allowed to leave 
their individual rooms, where specific infectious disease 
prevention procedures were implemented.64
Timely identification of contacts
Ferretti et al reported an estimated reproduction number 
of the initial SARS- CoV-2 variants of 2.0, of which 0.9 was 
associated with infection occurring during the presymp-
tomatic stage, suggesting about half of the cases were 
infected by patients with COVID-19 before symptom 
onset.65 An individual infected by SARS- CoV-2 can actively 
shed the virus from their respiratory system 6 days before 
and 3 weeks after displaying symptoms, depending on 
disease severity.34 48 While the virus detected in respiratory 
samples peaked within the first week of the illness, virus 
shedding continues in stool samples and peaks in week 
2 or 3.34 It, thus, is essential to stop the transmission by 
rapidly finding potential cases and their contacts and 
quarantining.66 One modelling study reported how mini-
mising testing delay effectively reduced onward trans-
mission.67 Countries may apply an additional week of 
self- health management beyond the 2- week quarantine 
period.24
Modelling studies have indicated that strategies to 
reduce random community contacts are preferable to 
those based solely on reducing personal contacts,40 68 
the duration of quarantine can vary depending on the 
reduction of contacts reached by individuals68 and testing 
at the beginning and the end of quarantine.69 The defi-
nition of contact may vary; Korea applied a focused 
testing strategy where, when a COVID-19 outbreak with 
an unknown source of infection occurred, there was the 
testing of individuals who were working, living or visiting 
in the outbreak area.70 Individuals who tested positive 
were hospitalised, whereas individuals who tested nega-
tive were self- quarantined for 14 days. The strategy effec-
tively reduced the proportion of COVID-19 cases with an 
unknown source of infection and the risk of transmission 
in the community.70 The direction of contact tracing may 
be forward or both forward and backward; the latter iden-
tifies unascertained or asymptomatic carriers and enables 
the isolation of those involved in otherwise undiscovered 
transmission.28
Digital tools to facilitate FTTIS
Conventional epidemiological contact tracing, which 
relies on personal interviews, is labour intensive and time- 
consuming and may be challenging during a large- scale 
epidemic.24 71 Some countries have applied digital tools 
in COVID-19 responses. Measures that use automated 
monitoring of geolocation data generated automatically 
by smartphones have advantages over voluntary tools 
(such as apps), but there may be differing concerns about 
privacy among countries.72–74
Types of telecommunication provider- based measures 
may include:
1. Mapping anonymised cell phone movement in a par-
ticular area (eg, Germany, Austria, Italy).
2. Base station triangulation to approximate cell phone 
location (Taiwan and Hungary)75 or
3. Access to Global Positioning System (GPS) data gener-
ated by the phone (Israel).
Voluntary provision of data includes:
1. An app that captures proximity to other enabled mo-
bile devices within a specified range via Bluetooth 
(Singapore, Austria).
2. An App recording daily symptoms (South Korea, Tai-
wan, Poland, UK) or
3. A Quick Response (QR) code for entry or exit to key 
locations (China).
Aslam et al reviewed the digital tools used in East 
Asian countries for COVID-19 response by their level of 
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intrusiveness.54 Low intrusive digital tools provide services 
to individuals and act as the interface between authori-
ties and service users.60 Such tools are generally widely 
accepted. Other tools are used to enforce quarantine and 
may involve individual movement restrictions and privacy 
concerns.76 These are subjected to debate and have lower 
acceptability, yet large- scale uptake (60%–75% of the 
population) may be necessary for them to be effective.73 
For example, in Singapore, the initial voluntary use of the 
contact tracing app was only 12%.73 The use of such apps 
requires a clear legal basis for the information that can be 
used exclusively for infectious disease control and comes 
with strong legal limits on data access.54 74
Support for individuals complying with self-isolation
Webster et al identified factors associated with adher-
ence, which included the knowledge people had about 
the disease and quarantine procedures, social norms, 
perceived benefits of quarantine and perceived risk of the 
disease as well as practical issues such as access to essen-
tial supplies or the financial consequences of being out 
of work.77 Self- isolation or quarantine may not be afford-
able for low wage and informal workers.78 To address 
financial needs, the Singaporean government provides 
self- employed persons and businesses with employees 
undergoing self- isolation or quarantine (SHN) a US$100 
per day support. Deliveries of food and other supplies can 
be arranged for individuals in SHN, through a designated 
hotline. By law, landlords and dormitory operators cannot 
evict tenants in SHN. For individuals in residences may 
not be suitable for SHN, the government offers hotels as 
an alternative.64
Psychological stress,77 79 80 cognitive dissonance74 or 
lack of physical activities81 during self- isolation may 
adversely affect mental or physical health. While anxiety 
was reported to be positively associated with an interest in 
security- related actions, perceived restriction to personal 
freedom had a negative impact on taking these actions 
and loneliness related to nonaction.82 In a rapid review, 
Brooks et al reported individuals in quarantine experi-
encing confusion, anger and post- traumatic stress symp-
toms, for reasons such as fear of infection, frustration, 
boredom and inadequate supplies.77 Austria and Germany 
reported an increase in domestic violence associated 
with COVID-19 restrictions.83 Strategies to mitigate these 
adverse effects include timely and sufficient information 
to reduce uncertainty, minimising the quarantine period 
to no longer than is necessary and providing adequate 
supplies for individuals serving self- isolation.
Razai et al suggested using validated psychological 
screening tools, such as the UCLA Loneliness Scale and 
Patient Health Questionnaire-4 for anxiety and depres-
sion to identify individuals who need support. This can 
help identify those who may benefit from counselling, 
coaching via telephone or online video consultations.80 
Nonmedical social prescribing, such as visual choirs, 
online theatre or performances, exercise or art classes 
can reduce boredom. Communication using social media 
may ease loneliness. Banskota et al reviewed smartphone 
apps to assist older adults in coping with self- isolation, 
designed for social networking, food and drinks delivery, 
medical consultation, health and fitness.84 Meinert et al 
described an agile process to develop an app for older 
people and their families to improve well- being while 
observing social distancing rules.85
How would real-time data management, linkage of data sets 
and dashboards be developed, and who would ‘own this’?
In Austria, the nationwide online COVID-19 dashboard 
has facilitated effective early response to COVID-19 
pandemic.83 In South Korea, the government links digital 
databases to facilitate contact tracing, including elec-
tronic health records, phone- based GPS, card transaction 
records and closed circuit television.72 Yasaka et al have 
proposed the use of an app with three guides, requiring 
users to register with checkpoints (eg, public spaces or 
shops with a QR code that can be scanned to the app), 
check risk level and report COVID-19 status.86 Likewise, 
in China, a QR code- based app is used to limit the move-
ment of suspected patients with COVID-19 and displays 
a green, amber or red code that is required to be in or 
enter locations, but the digital surveillance architecture 
and data protection mechanisms remain unclear.54 73 74 
Consequently, public concerns about data protection and 
privacy have been raised in respect to both the Chinese 
and South Korean apps.
The efficacy of mobile positioning data (although not 
possible for 2G phones) was studied in Nigeria by Ekong 
et al based on systems used in South Korea, Singapore 
and China.87 A legal framework for data protection was 
suggested when implementing these systems and a third- 
party agreement was put in place for data use.
Mobile geopositioning data
Mobile geopositioning has been used to study the 
mobility, connectivity and health risks in travellers.88 
These have an accuracy of 150 metres, so they reduce 
the risk of undermining individual privacy.24 Taiwan has 
applied a geopositioning method to facilitate adherence 
to home isolation or quarantine, rapidly identifying 
contacts in a suspected large- scale outbreak. An example 
is the identification of 627 386 contacts of the 3000 
Diamond Princess passengers touring in Taiwan during 
a COVID-19 outbreak.24 The process took a day and text 
messages advising self- health management were sent 
to all contacts. Contact data were linked to electronic 
health records for follow- up and testing of symptomatic 
contacts. Geopositioning data have lessened the pressure 
on health authorities who would otherwise have relied 
on resource- intensive manual contact tracing, facilitating 
timely large- scale outbreak containment. The resources 
saved by leveraging technology can then be used for 
taking care of vulnerable populations and those without 
access to a mobile phone.
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How would a ‘rapid response’ occur and what would 
precipitate such a response?
On 22 January, an individual from Wuhan who had trav-
elled to Hong Kong reported respiratory symptoms, and 
a second suspected case was reported the next day. Both 
received medical care, being placed in isolation and later 
testing positive for COVID-19. Contact tracing started 
immediately and the travel histories of patients were 
retrieved and published online. All their close contacts, 
including passengers seated close by and taxi drivers, were 
subjected to quarantine at a holiday village converted to 
a quarantine centre to host contacts of confirmed cases. 
A hotline was set up to answer public enquiries, especially 
for passengers on the same train/flight.85
In Singapore, proactive contact tracing and cluster 
identification are key features of the country’s COVID-19 
response. Health professionals are trained to identify 
potential outbreak clusters, asking a series of questions 
to patients with COVID-19. The Ministry of Health works 
with hotels to develop quarantine sites and liaises with 
those possessing the closed- circuit television footage to 
track cases.85
Infection control
Inadequate infection control during isolation or quaran-
tine may increase the transmission of SARS- CoV-2. Close 
quarter isolation was found to be ineffective89 in the case of 
the Diamond Princess. The virus spread to 634 passengers 
despite contact tracing90 and safety measures,91 leading the 
authors to conclude that aerosol transmission played an 
important role in confined settings. However, this was ques-
tioned by Wang et al in a hospital study of transmission via air, 
sewage, surfaces and personal protective equipment in which 
swabs tested positive only from sewage.92
Nosocomial infection
Nosocomial infection and cross infection of health workers 
were reported at the Sheffield Teaching Hospitals NHS Foun-
dation Trust; of 1533 symptomatic healthcare workers, 18% 
were positive for SARS- CoV-2.93 It was estimated that a third 
of staff had completed a shift while symptomatic, empha-
sising the need for regular and efficient testing for healthcare 
workers who have a high risk of infection, for the protection 
of vulnerable patients and civilians. A study in Taiwan on the 
risks of contact infection before and after symptom onset 
showed that the spread of COVID-19 was highest within the 
first 4 days of infection. In comparison with transmission to 
medical staff, most transmissions took place in the family or 
social settings, partially due to the absence of the personal 
protective equipment (PPE) and partially due to contact in 
the early stages of infection (presymptomatic).94
To control nosocomial infection, Taiwan implemented 
nationwide enhanced Traffic Control Bundling (eTCB) in 
hospitals, whereby infection was controlled with a combina-
tion of triage prior to hospitalisation, separation between risk 
zones, strict PPE use and hand disinfection checkpoints.60 95 
Risk zones were divided into the contamination, interme-
diate and, finally, clean. This drew on earlier research by Yen 
et al in which SARS infection among healthcare workers in 
the eTCB hospital was 2(0.03 cases per bed) compared with 
50 probable cases (0.13 cases per bed) in the control group.96 
This strategy was implemented across Taiwan on 21 May 2003 
and within 2 weeks the epidemic was under control.
How would an app be assimilated in light of the above?
The Singaporean government has developed the App ‘Trac-
eTogether’ to support manual contact tracing,97 recording 
other users who have been in proximity to a smartphone 
user via Bluetooth. After a user is found to be positive, indi-
viduals at risk are contacted directly.54 74 The Pan- European 
Privacy- Preserving Proximity Tracing coalition proposed 
a privacy- friendly contact tracing apps with the use of 
matching Bluetooth signals, based on the Singaporean 
‘TraceTogether’ app.73 The Korean Ministry of the Inte-
rior and Safety has developed a mobile phone application 
named ‘self- quarantine safety protection’ app that monitors 
the location of the quarantined user, informs health author-
ities, allows the user to report on their symptoms, and 
health officials can evaluate if a test is needed.72 TRACE, the 
national contact tracing programme in Taiwan, developed 
in 2017 has an integrated system to monitor health, trace 
contacts and link to other databases for a range of infec-
tious diseases. The location of individuals could be tracked 
and communication between the user, Taiwan Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), police and authori-
ties as well as local health departments could be centralised 
through this platform for reporting symptoms and contact 
tracing.98
What are the barriers to and enablers of being tested, 
reporting contacts and isolating as a result of being 
contacted?
Logistics
A lack of public health funding may weaken outbreak 
preparedness.99 Regionalisation of the healthcare system 
might result in fragmentation of the epidemic response 
and timely data availability.22 Scarcity of healthcare 
resources creates major barriers to COVID-19 control.100
Testing
With the USA in mind, Parmet et al encouraged the promo-
tion of ‘free testing’ in order to reach poorer communities 
and eradicate the infection.78 Although the UK implemented 
free testing for adults, there have been challenges in 
communicating information on how to obtain a test and 
in what circumstances, particularly among certain ethnic 
minority groups. Understanding the factors associated with 
testing uptake in the population may inform better testing 
strategies.101 Mark et al reviewed the feasibility of a mobile 
community testing team in Scotland and reported a lack of 
guidance on infection control for testing in the community, 
thereby risking cross- transmission. Other barriers included 
the shortage of staff,102 shortage of testing kits and strict 
testing eligibility, which excludes asymptomatic patients from 
receiving testing on time.83
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Contact tracing
Validity and reliability of information recorded by an app may 
not be accurate or precise due to technological limitations.84 
Klonowska et al summarised the high coverage needed for an 
app to be effective. This may be difficult to reach on a volun-
tary basis, for issues such as mobile storage data, operating 
systems and battery power to support constant Bluetooth acti-
vation, the fact that young children and senior citizens may 
not carry or own a personal smart device and the issue of indi-
vidual willingness.73 In the UK, only 47% of individuals who 
are 75 years or older use the internet.103 Senior citizens in the 
Netherlands were also less likely to adopt a contact tracing 
app than their younger peers.104 It is essential that outbreak 
control teams cater to their needs and those of community 
volunteers, such as the NHS volunteer responders in the 
UK.80
Isolation
Logistic challenges arise in providing food, sanitation, 
transport105 and care for individuals living in a restricted 
zone, especially if this covers a large area.78
Public awareness and communication
The number of tests carried out during an emergency will 
depend on public perception of the reliability of testing 
services and the effectiveness of communication of actions 
that can be taken. It is also necessary to ensure that kits and 
the location of testing stations are accessible to disadvantaged 
groups who may not have access to a smartphone or basic 
supplies. Where ethnic minorities are at greater risk, special 
efforts must be made to encourage them to access tests. 
Regular press conferences by authorities, briefing on the 
progress of the pandemic, changes in policies and correcting 
misinformation60 can increase public awareness of the 
need for FTTIS and tackle rumours that arise where there 
are knowledge gaps and uncertainties.95 However, under- 
reporting of COVID-19 deaths by the government may occur 
in countries with incomplete vital registration or under polit-
ical influence.20 106
The internet and social media have an important influ-
ence on behaviour in isolation,107 which has grown with 
increased internet use since the COVID-19 lockdown. 
Farooq et al tracked the effects of social media, news 
websites and emails as well as the living situation on the 
individual level, and the intention of self- isolation during 
the pandemic in a panel of 225 participants108 and found 
that while frequent social media use contributed to infor-
mation overload and cyberchondria, it increased propen-
sity for self- isolation. McNeill et al similarly studied the 
effects of tweets and found that social media played a 
role in the motivation to conform to health measures.109 
Based on populational surveys, Kowalski et al reported 
that conspiracy beliefs of COVID-19 were negatively 
associated with adherence to self- isolation guidelines 
in Poland.110 To motivate members of the public to 
self- isolate in a healthy way, a combination of lowering 
perceived response costs and clear information about 
the severity of risks should be implemented.108 111 It is 
also suggested that messages of the severity of disease be 
disseminated via reliable official networks such as govern-
ment outreach, news and journalism, while social media 
focuses on hopeful messages and recommended health 
measures.112
Legal issues
In Singapore, the Infectious Diseases Act provides a legal 
basis to prosecute those who are noncompliant, with 
resulting fines and/or imprisonment.64 Similarly, the 
Communicable Disease Control Act in Taiwan mandates 
the government to implement effective measures in 
COVID-19 controls including FTTIS.60
In the USA, the Public Health Service Act empowers 
the Surgeon General (delegated to the CDC) to enforce 
quarantine and isolation and provide medical care for 
detained individuals. Court rulings establish that quaran-
tine cannot be imposed in a way that is racially discrimina-
tory, and governments are required to have a strong legal 
basis for imposed restrictions.78
Public cooperation
The effective control of the highly contagious COVID-19 
epidemic relies on collaboration by individuals to volun-
tarily provide their information and comply with preven-
tive measures. In low or middle- income countries, low 
public trust due to government corruption impedes 
public cooperation to observe FTTI regulations.113 The 
potential undesirable outcome of telling the truth, such 
as adverse immigration consequences for noncitizens, 
deportation of undocumented migrants or refusal of 
entry for passengers with a fever, can be a barrier for 
these individuals, who may be at high risk of infection, 
to seek care or provide accurate information.78 Results 
from a multinational survey in France, Germany, Italy, 
the UK and USA showed high public acceptability of a 
contact- tracing app.114 Perceived benefits, self- efficacy115 
and trust116 were positively associated with contact tracing 
apps uptake. Special protection of personal information 
is needed, with the goal of facilitating trust, prioritising 
care and encouraging individuals to cooperate and to 
prevent further transmission of the disease.
Economic support
To ease the economic pressure and uncertainty during 
large- scale quarantine, governments have established 
different schemes to support individuals and families. 
Income compensation during quarantine has shown to 
double the compliance with self- isolation.117 East Asian 
countries have provided support schemes for employers, 
employees and households.54 In the USA, the federal 
government passed the Families First Coronavirus 
Response Act, including paid sick leave and unemploy-
ment insurance.96 Countries implemented funding, 
financial stimulus, loans, aid packages to support the 
economy83 or individual livelihood.118 In the UK, national 
job retention schemes and financial support schemes 
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have been rolled out to support individuals and busi-
nesses during the COVID-19 epidemic.96
DISCUSSION
We identified in our systematic review the core elements 
for an effective FTTIS system necessary to interrupt the 
spread of a novel infectious disease, as in the COVID-19 
pandemic. The optimal strategies for a successful FTTIS 
during COVID-19 rapid response include:
Finding
Border controls, restricted entry and inbound traveller 
quarantine applied early in the pandemic have both 
reduced the spread of COVID-19 and facilitated case 
finding. Testing high- risk populations (such as health-
care workers or residents of long- term care facilities) is 
important for active case finding, especially during the 
early stages.
Testing
During the initial response to a pandemic, repurposing 
of an existing laboratory network for testing should be 
implemented where possible while establishing new 
testing sites to meet increasing needs as the pandemic 
progresses. Pooled testing can be used to improve testing 
efficiency. Repeated testing may be necessary to minimise 
false- negative results.
Trace and isolate
Digital tools such as apps, GPS and mobile geopositioning 
data have been deployed effectively by some countries 
for contact tracing and to monitor compliance with self- 
isolation. As an individual infected by SARS- CoV-2 can 
actively shed the virus 3 weeks or longer after symptoms 
onset, the duration of quarantine may vary. A 2- week 
quarantine period with extension when required has 
been adopted by various countries.
Support
Support can be in the form of mental health or physical 
health promotion or monetary aid, such as timely and 
adequate information to reduce uncertainty and anxiety, 
providing adequate supplies or allowance for individ-
uals. These support measures also facilitate public trust 
that is fundamental in the joint COVID-19 response in 
the population, as it relies on individuals to voluntarily 
provide their information and adhere to disease control 
regulations.
Integrated system
Although these measures, often combined, are imple-
mented in different countries, the level of preparedness, 
timely implementation and scale- up of effective measures 
made the difference between119 or within120 countries. For 
incidence, insufficient testing and quarantine led to the 
undetected wide transmission of SARS- CoV-2, resulting 
in high case fatality during the first month of COVID-19 
epidemic in Italy22 and similarly in the Middle East20 or 
during the first wave in the UK.121
A successful FTTIS requires seamless integration of all 
the components and the ability to integrate vulnerable 
populations or ethnic minorities. Linked health service 
data can contribute to the cooperation and communica-
tions among responsible authorities (central and local 
government, borders, laboratories and the medical care 
system) through real- time data sharing and dashboards.
Public collaboration
In addition to support for individuals, regular press 
conferences by the central outbreak control team to 
provide a briefing on the progress of the pandemic, 
changes in policies and correcting misinformation can 
increase public awareness of the need for FTTIS. Open 
and balanced discussions on public concerns, such as 
personal data privacy and protection and limitations on 
individuals’ freedom for the public good, are essential.
Agile process
The uncertainty and rapid progression of the pandemic 
make it important to have the flexibility to adapt rapidly 
to emerging challenges. A rolling- wave approach to plan-
ning can help authorities learn, apply and refine tools for 
prevention and control, with an agile process allowing 
better responses to emergencies.
Strengths
We found no published systematic review addressing 
simultaneously the finding, test, tracing, isolation and 
support in the early response of COVID-19. Results of 
our review thus may inform countries facing future 
pandemics.
Limitations
We reviewed studies published in English, thus enable the 
review team to cross- validate the results. Although infor-
mation documented in other languages might be missed, 
our search included studies from all regions of the world. 
Our review focused on FTTIS in the early phase of the 
pandemic. However, going forward, it will be important 
to draw on lessons learnt later in the pandemic.
Conclusion
This comprehensive systematic review identified effec-
tive strategies for a successful FTTIS system to interrupt 
the spread of a novel infectious disease. These include 
border controls, restricted entry, inbound traveller quar-
antine and screening for case finding; repeated testing to 
minimise false diagnoses and pooled testing in resource- 
limited circumstances; extended quarantine period 
and the use of digital tools for contact tracing and self- 
isolation. Support for mental or physical health and liveli-
hood is needed for individuals undergoing self- isolation/
quarantine. An integrated system with rolling- wave plan-
ning can best use effective FTTIS tools to respond to the 
fast- changing COVID-19 pandemic. Results of the review 
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may inform countries considering implementing these 
measures.
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